Category: Risk Management

By Robert G. Chadwick, Jr, Managing Member, Seltzer Chadwick Soefje & Ladik, PLLC.

For more than thirty years, sexual harassment has been a recognized form of discrimination prohibited by federal and state employment discrimination laws. Prudent employers have thus long recognized written policies and training to be essential risk management tools for combating sexual harassment in the workplace.

Recently, the effectiveness of employer policies and training has come into question. A June 2016 Report of the EEOC Select Task Force on the Study of Harassment in the Workplace noted: “Much of the training done over the last 30 years has not worked as a prevention tool—it’s been too focused on simply avoiding legal liability.”

Although the June 2016 EEOC Report set forth only recommendations for effective sexual harassment training, some state legislatures have gone further.  On April 12, 2018, New York joined California, Connecticut, and Maine in prescribing sexual harassment prevention measures which must be undertaken by private employers.

These state prescriptions include not only the content and form of harassment policies, but also the content, form, timing, frequency, length, trainer qualifications, and proof of attendance requirements of harassment training. Although much of the prescribed content can be used in any state, some of the prescribed content is state-specific.

New York

The New York legislation, for instance, requires the adoption by the New York State Division of Human Rights (“DHR”) of a model prevention policy. The model policy must meet certain minimum standards, which include references to “state statutory provisions concerning sexual harassment” and state “forums for adjudicating sexual harassment complaints administratively and judicially.” Employers must either adopt the model policy or establish a policy that equals or exceeds the minimum standards of the model policy.

The legislation also mandates the production by the DHR of a model prevention training program. The model program must be interactive and include references to “state statutory provisions concerning sexual harassment”, and available state forums for adjudicating complaints. Employers must either adopt the model program or establish a program that equal or exceeds the minimum standards of the model program. Under either option, training must be provided annually.

New York’s new law is effective October 9, 2018.

California

Since 2004, California has required that employers with 50 or more employees provide detailed sexual harassment training for supervisors. Such training must be provided within six months of hire and on a biennial basis. The training must be provided in a classroom setting, through interactive learning, or through a live webinar, and must be at least two hours in length. Only attorneys, human resources professionals, harassment prevention consultants and professors or instructors with specific credentials can provide training.

Amongst the prescribed content of training are the definition of “sexual harassment” under the California Fair Employment & Housing Act (“FEHA”), and “FEHA … statutory provisions and case law principles concerning the prohibition against and the prevention of unlawful sexual harassment, discrimination and retaliation in employment.”

Since 2016, California regulations state that a covered employer in California must have a harassment, discrimination and retaliation policy meeting several minimum requirements. Among these requirements are the protections afforded to employees by FEHA.  Under California regulations, employers also have a continuing obligation to distribute to employees the brochure regarding sexual harassment published by the California Department of Fair Employment and Housing.

Pending Legislation

In the wake of the #MeToo movement, state-specific measures are likely only to gain steam.  In California, bills have been introduced to extend mandated training to smaller employers and non-supervisory employees. Existing bills in Connecticut seek to update that state’s existing mandates.  A bill to require harassment training has also been introduced in Delaware.  

The Emerging Reality for Multi-State Employers

Most multi-state employers already have a national strategy for preventing and redressing sexual harassment. Multi-state employers with workers in California have  long recognized the importance of also having a California strategy for managing the risks associated with sexual harassment in that state.

The New York legislation, and the pending legislation in other states, highlight an emerging reality for multi-state employers. The number of states requiring state-specific risk management strategies as to sexual harassment is growing.  For multi-state employers with workers in New York this emerging reality already has a due date – October 9, 2018.

The Winter 2018 Edition of Professional Liability Defense Quarterly, published by the Professional Liability Defense Federation (PLDF), features an article by Robert G. Chadwick, Jr., entitled “Employee Non-Disclosure Agreements Post-Weinstein And #MeToo.”

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By Robert G. Chadwick, Jr., Managing Member, Seltzer Chadwick Soefje & Ladik, PLLC

In today’s divisive political and cultural climate, it is not surprising that confrontations between workers and customers are commonplace.

On February 12, 2018, a state trooper who had pulled up to the drive-thru of a Normal, Illinois McDonald’s restaurant was allegedly greeted by an employee with the expletive “F*** the police.” Upon hearing of the incident, the franchise owner made the immediate decision to terminate the offending employee.

In this circumstance, the employer was likely acting within its legal rights in firing the offending employee. After all, the customer did nothing to provoke the employee. The customer was right.

But, what if the circumstances are different? What if a female employee berates or slaps a male customer who gropes her? What if an African American employee curses a Caucasian customer who calls him “boy?” What, if anything, does the employer risk by doing nothing? What, if anything, does the employer risk by disciplining or discharging the employee?

The Risk of Acceding To Customer Preferences

A good starting point for addressing these questions is the clash often faced by employers between customer preferences and employment discrimination laws. The desire to please a paying customer can be a compelling incentive to accede to his or her preferences or demands. However, if the preference or demand is that the employer engage in unlawful employment discrimination, the price of acquiescence can be civil liability.

In Chaney v. Plainfield Healthcare Center, for instance, an African-American healthcare worker challenged, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, a nursing home’s policy of honoring the racial preferences of its residents in assigning health care providers. The nursing home acknowledged it routinely acceded to patient demands for white-only health care providers.

In denying the nursing home’s motion for summary judgment, the 7th Circuit said in a July 20, 2010 opinion: “It is now widely accepted that a company’s desire to cater to the perceived racial preferences of its customers is not a defense under Title VII for treating employees differently based on race.”

In Wilson v. Southwest Airlines, male applicants said they had been rejected for positions as Southwest flight attendants based upon gender, in violation of Title VII. Southwest  admitted its policy of hiring only female flight attendants, but argued their sex appeal was a bona fide occupational qualification.

In rejecting Southwest’s defense, a Texas federal court opined in a June 12, 1981 decision:
“Southwest is not a business where vicarious sex entertainment is the primary service provided. Accordingly, the ability of the airline to perform its primary business function, the transportation of passengers, would not be jeopardized by hiring males. Southwest does not face the situation … where an established customer preference for one sex is so strong that the business would be undermined if employees of the opposite sex were hired.”

To be sure, there may be circumstances where customer preference can be a bona fide occupational qualification. The aforementioned cases, however, show that customer preference cannot always justify otherwise unlawful discrimination against an employee.

The Risk Of Doing Nothing

The issue of customer preference also arises when an employee complains of discriminatory harassment by a customer. The employer may prefer not to upset or lose a customer by taking prompt remedial action. However, if the employer does nothing it risks potential liability to the complaining employee.

In Lockard v. Pizza Hut, another Title VII suit, a female waitress employed by a Pizza Hut franchisee claimed her employer did not respond properly to the inappropriate conduct of “two crude and rowdy made customers” who frequented the restaurant. She specifically testified her employer did nothing when the men made sexually offensive comments to her, such as “I would like to get into your pants”, and one man pulled her to him by the hair, grabbed her breast and put his mouth on her breast.

In denying the employers motion to set aside a jury verdict in favor the female waitress, the 10th Circuit noted in a December 14, 1998 opinion: “An employer who condones or tolerates the creation of such an environment should be held liable regardless of whether the environment was created by a co-employee or a nonemployee, since the employer ultimately controls the conditions of the work environment.”

The Risk Of Firing The Employee

Finally, the behavior of an employee in response to inappropriate conduct of a customer may, viewed in isolation, be considered grounds for discipline or termination. Viewed in context, however, the behavior may arguably be protected opposition under employment discrimination laws. Disciplining or terminating the employee, therefore, may prompt a retaliation claim.

In Folkerson v. Circus Circus Enterprises, Inc., for example. a mime artist punched a casino patron who attempted to embrace her during a performance. For this behavior, the mime was terminated. The mime sued under Title VII arguing her behavior was protected opposition to discrimination.

In an October 16, 1995 opinion, the 9th Circuit agreed that “reasonable defense against physical violence may be protected oppositional activity.” Finding the mime’s reaction reasonable under the circumstances, the court reversed a grant of summary judgment for the employer.

In Van Horn v. Specialized Support Services, Inc., the Title VII plaintiff was a female employee of a company which provides services to developmentally disabled clients.  In her complaint, she detailed the conduct of a client who, over the course of time, said he loved her, and attempted to hug her. Although the female employee complained of the client’s behavior, the employer allegedly did nothing. One day, the client pinched the female employee’s breast. In response, the female employee instinctively slapped the client. For this behavior, the female employee was terminated.

Although the Iowa federal court found insufficient evidence of a hostile work environment, a January 29, 2003 ruling found that slapping the client was protected opposition under Title VII. The Court opined: “when an employer’s failure to act forces an employee to act in self- defense at the workplace, the employee’s defensive conduct is reasonable and the employee cannot be terminated for doing so.”

To be clear, most federal discrimination cases have sided with the employer where an employee responds to perceived discrimination by cursing, shouting or resorting to physical violence. The aforementioned cases, however, show that courts may be more willing to find questionable behavior to be reasonable if it follows inaction by the employer in responding to prior incidents of harassment.

The Risk Of Siding With The Employee

No discussion of the risks arising from confrontations between employees and customers is complete without mention of an employer’s potential liability to customers for discrimination. Federal, state and local laws prohibit discrimination in public accommodations and contracts.  A comprehensive discussion of these laws is beyond the scope of this article. An employer must nevertheless be mindful of such laws before terminating a customer contract or refusing service to a customer based upon a confrontation with an employee.

Takeaway For Employers

When presented with evidence of a confrontation between an employee and a customer, an employer’s first instinct may be to side with the customer. Following that instinct, however, may risk liability under employment discrimination laws. Siding with the employee can also have legal consequences.

As with any unfortunate incident involving an employee, therefore, an employer must  undertake a reasonably diligent and unbiased effort to determine the truth. Sometimes, appearances can be deceiving, and the truth may lie beyond the single incident. Admittedly, a more comprehensive investigation will require more work than a rush to judgment. Still, it is more prudent to work to prevent an unwanted claim, than to work to defend an unwanted claim.

By Robert G. Chadwick, Jr., Managing Member, Seltzer Chadwick Soefje & Ladik, PLLC.

Political controversies, such as President Trump’s alleged use of the term “sh**hole” in reference to third-world countries, serve as a reminder to private employers that profanity in the workplace can also be a controversial issue. There is no federal law which expressly addresses profanity in the workplace, but profanity can still be at the heart of a legal dispute under applicable employment laws.

Protected Profanity?

The National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”), for instance, has said that concerted activities for the mutual aid or protection of employees can be legally protected under the National Labor Relations Act even if laced with profanity. Several decisions show just how far the NLRB has gone to protect employee speech rights.

On May 19, 2014, an administrative law judge of the NLRB in Hooters of Ontario Mills found that a Hooters’ franchise had unlawfully fired an employee for shouting “you’re a f***ing b**ch” within earshot of customers during a bikini contest. The judge opined that the profanity was tied to a protected complaint that the contest was rigged. The employee was ordered to be reinstated.

On May 28, 2014, in Plaza Auto Center, Inc., the NLRB held that a business owner unlawfully discharged an employee who called him a “f***ing mother f***ing”, a “f***ing crook”, and an a**hole.” The NLRB said these statements were made during a meeting in which the employee lodged a protected complaint as to the calculation of sales commissions. The employee was ordered to be reinstated.

On March 31, 2015, in Pier Sixty, LLC, the NLRB again held that an employer unlawfully terminated an employee for the following Facebook post about his supervisor during a union organizing campaign: “Bob is such a NASTY MOTHER F***ER don’t know how to talk to people!!!!!! F*** his mother and his entire f***ing family!!!! What a LOSER!!! Vote YES for the UNION.” The NLRB opined that the Facebook comments were directed at the supervisor’s asserted mistreatment of employees, and sought redress through the upcoming election, and thus constituted protected, concerted and union activity. The employee was ordered to be reinstated.

Unlawful Profanity?

Under certain circumstances, moreover, workplace profanity may provide the basis for a claim of harassment under federal discrimination laws. Indeed, some decisions have found that severe and pervasive profanity can be the entire basis of a harassment claim.

On October 25, 2013, in Griffin v. City of Portland, an Oregon federal court decided the city’s motion for summary judgment as to a religious discrimination suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) and Oregon law. The employee, a devout Christian, alleged frequent profanity in the workplace, including the use of God’s and Jesus Christ’s name as curse words. The court found genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether the employee was subjected to a hostile work environment because of her religion.

On April 28, 2008, in Reeves v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, the Eleventh Circuit decided a summary judgment motion as to a Title VII claim of sexual harassment. Unique to the fact pattern in this case was the existence of gender specific vulgarities which were not targeted or directed at women. The plaintiff specifically complained that sexually offensive language, such as “f**k”, “whore”, “b**ch”, “c*nt” and “d**k”, from multiple coworkers permeated the work environment every day. The court denied summary judgment for the employer.

Takeaway for Employers

As with many workplace issues, employers can face a legal tightrope when it comes to profanity in the workplace. An overly broad or aggressive approach can trigger an unfair labor practice charge with the NLRB. Ignoring or tolerating profanity altogether can trigger a harassment complaint. To traverse this legal tightrope, it is imperative that managers and supervisors be trained as to how to lead by example and how to respond to cursing employees. The risk of not doing so can be dire.

By Robert G. Chadwick, Jr., Managing Member, Seltzer Chadwick Soefje & Ladik, PLLC.

News stories, such as the accusations against U.S. Senate candidate Roy Moore and his corresponding denials, serve as reminders of what many employers already know from experience; often, an investigation of a sexual harassment claim yields two conflicting stories. The victim’s story is one of improper behavior by a supervisor, co-worker, customer or vendor. The accused’s story is one of denial and perhaps speculation regarding an ulterior motive for the harassment claim. Especially when there are no witnesses to the alleged behavior, the conflicting stories present the employer with a difficult question – what do I do now?

One action which should not be considered by the employer is the termination of the investigation without any analysis of the credibility of the competing stories. If the employer ultimately takes no remedial action, this action risks a claim by the victim, as part of a legal claim for sexual harassment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) or state law, that the investigation was merely cursory. If the employer fires the accused, this action risks a claim by the accused that the investigation was a mere pretext for sexual discrimination in violation of Title VII or state law.

So, how does an employer go about assessing the credibility of two competing stories? In 1999, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) published guidance as to this question.

If there are conflicting versions of relevant events, the employer will have to weigh each party’s credibility. Credibility assessments can be critical in determining whether the alleged harassment in fact occurred. Factors to consider include:

• Inherent plausibility: Is the testimony believable on its face? Does it make sense?
• Demeanor: Did the person seem to be telling the truth or lying?
• Motive to falsify: Did the person have a reason to lie?
• Corroboration: Is there witness testimony (such as testimony by eye-witnesses, people who saw the person soon after the alleged incidents, or people who discussed the incidents with him or her at around the time that they occurred) or physical evidence (such as written documentation) that corroborates the party’s testimony?
• Past record: Did the alleged harasser have a history of similar behavior in the past?

None of the above factors are determinative as to credibility. For example, the fact that there are no eye-witnesses to the alleged harassment by no means necessarily defeats the complainant’s credibility, since harassment often occurs behind closed doors. Furthermore, the fact that the alleged harasser engaged in similar behavior in the past does not necessarily mean that he or she did so again.

When weighing the credibility of a sexual harassment complaint, moreover, it is not necessary that the employer believe either story “beyond a reasonable doubt.” Indeed, holding the victim or accused to such a burden may itself be discriminatory.  All that is necessary is that the employer reasonably believe one of the two competing stories to be more believable than the other story.

So, what if the credibility assessment is still inconclusive as to the competing stories? Again, the risk of taking no remedial action whatsoever is a legal claim by the victim. At the very least, an employer should formulate and implement a plan to monitor the situation more closely. The employer should also consider sexual harassment training or refresher training if sexual harassment training has previously been provided.

To be sure, credibility assessment is not an exact science. The employer may never know the complete truth even after an investigation. Even if the truth proves to be elusive, however, the employer may still be called upon to defend in litigation the integrity of its effort to determine the truth. Accordingly, the goal of an employer in conducting a sexual harassment investigation must be a reasonably diligent and unbiased effort to determine the truth.  The consequences of not achieving this goal can be liability for discrimination under Title VII or state law.

By Robert G. Chadwick, Jr., Managing Member, Seltzer Chadwick Soefje & Ladik, PLLC.

According to a New York Times article published on October 5, 2017, employees of the Weinstein Company have agreements wherein they agree not to harm the company’s “business reputation” or “any employee’s personal reputation.” According to the article, employees who settled claims of sexual harassment against the company against the company and its co-founder, Harvey Weinstein, also signed agreements whereby they agreed to keep the claims and settlement confidential.  For years, these agreements kept the substance and number of harassment allegations against Harvey Weinstein secret.

Non-disclosure agreements between employees and employers are not unusual. They can provide additional protections for an employer’s trade secrets and confidential data not provided by the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016 or state trade secrets law. They can also encompass sensitive data entrusted to an employer by customers, vendors and employees, thereby mitigating the risk of legal exposure for breach of such confidences. Employee handbook provisions addressing the security of trade secrets and confidential data are also common.

Non-disparagement agreements between employee and employees are less prevalent, but also not unusual. They can provide additional safeguards to an employer’s reputation not provided by state defamation or breach of fiduciary duty laws.  Employee handbooks also commonly include disparagement of the employer and employees as a ground for discipline, up to and including termination.

As a condition to receipt of severance pay, or payment of a disputed claim (other than a Fair Labor Standards Act claim), it is also routine for an employer to require a confidentiality agreement in addition to a release. For some employers, a confidentiality agreement has more value than the release. Without a pledge of confidentiality, the employer may decide to pay less or nothing at all for a release of claims.

In the wake of the sexual harassment allegations against Harvey Weinstein, however, what have historically been routine agreements are under new and intense scrutiny. Such scrutiny has raised key questions: Do such agreements enable future discrimination by eliminating unwanted publicity as a deterrent? Are such agreements legal? Do such agreements violate public policy?

With such intense scrutiny, it is likely that some government action as to non-disclosure agreements and non-disparagement is forthcoming.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

In EEOC v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) unsuccessfully argued that a severance agreement, which included a confidentiality clause, had the purpose or effect of deterring employees from filing or assisting with charges of discrimination. Considering the aggressive approach by the EEOC in recent years, it is conceivable the Commission will seek to revisit this argument in another suit. The agency may also seek to test in litigation the argument that confidentiality clauses contravene federal employment discrimination statutes by perpetuating silence about unlawful discrimination.

National Labor Relations Board

The National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) protects “concerted activities for mutual protection” by non-supervisory employees, which necessarily encompasses the rights to communicate with one another about collective action, and to seek to improve terms and conditions of employment through channels outside the immediate employer-employee relationship. The National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) has confirmed this protection includes discussion of harassment.

Under NLRA jurisprudence, agreements and rules which tend to chill such discussions can be an unfair labor practice under the NLRA even in the absence of enforcement. On March 24, 2017, the D.C. Circuit in Banner Health System v. NLRB found an employer’s Confidentiality Agreement to be an unfair labor practice because it explicitly directed employees not to discuss co-workers “[p]rivate employee information.” On July 29, 2016,  the D.C .Circuit in Quicken Loans, Inc. v. NLRB, also held that a non-disparagement rule in an employment agreement constituted an unfair labor practice where it stated: “You agree that you will not (nor will you cause or cooperate with others to) publicly criticize, ridicule, disparage or defame the Company or its products, services, policies, directors, officers, shareholders, or employees …” For employers with overly broad rules or agreements regarding confidentiality or disparagement, unfair labor practice charges are already a risk.

State Action

On October 13, 2017, New York State Senators Brad Hoylman and Nily Rozic proposed new legislation which would void any contract provision whereby an employee is required to conceal claims of unlawful conduct, including harassment. Legislators in other states may soon follow suit.

Under the jurisprudence of most states, moreover, courts will not enforce agreements if their purpose or effect is to violate public policy. Indeed, many cases have specifically voided confidentiality or non-disclosure agreements which have the purpose or effect of suppressing information regarding criminal conduct.  Especially as to employment rights protected by statute, some courts may be persuaded to void confidentiality provisions which are deemed to be contrary to the purpose of the statute.

Takeaways for Employers

Periodic review of employment rules and agreements is always recommended to mitigate the risks of legal claims.  Employment law, perhaps more than any other area of law, is ever-changing.  What is lawful today, may be unlawful tomorrow.  Employers must thus be prepared to adjust employment rules and agreements as their legality comes under new scrutiny.  If not now for rules and agreements subject to the NLRA, the time may soon come for employers to revisit the viability of their non-disclosure rules and agreements, non-disparagement rules and agreements, severance agreements and settlement agreements.

By Robert G. Chadwick, Jr., Managing Member, Seltzer Chadwick Soefje & Ladik, PLLC.

The uncertainty associated with indefinite leaves of absence has prompted many employers to adopt policies which place a cap on the length of leaves of absence. A policy previously adopted by UPS is a common example:

“…if you are absent from your regular occupation for 12 months, you will be administratively separated from employment, regardless of your status on STD [short term disability] or LTD [long term disability].”

Uniform enforcement of a policy providing for administrative termination after a one-year leave of absence has, in fact, been found sufficient to defeat a claim of retaliatory discharge for filing a worker’s compensation claim. See Haggar Clothing Co. v. Hernandez, 164 S.W.3d 386 (Tex. 2005).

For eight years, however, UPS fought a suit brought by the EEOC alleging the aforementioned policy violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). On July 28, 2017, UPS finally agreed to a proposed consent decree with the EEOC. The proposed consent decree, which has not yet been approved by the court as of the date of this writing, requires UPS to, amongst other things, (1) “seek legal advice before terminating the employment of an employee who has reached the end of the medical leave of absence or residual duty/disability period; and (2) pay a group of aggrieved former employees $1,718,500.

What Does the ADA Require?

The ADA prohibits an employer from discriminating against an “qualified individual with a disability” who is an applicant or employee. One form of prohibited discrimination is the use of “qualification standards, employment tests, or other selection criteria that screen out or tend to screen out an individual with a disability or a class of individuals with disabilities unless the standard, test or other criteria …. Is shown [by the employer] to be job-related for the job in question and consistent with business necessity.”

Another form of prohibited discrimination is the failure to make “reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability … unless [the employer] can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business of [the employer].”

Can a Leave of Absence or Leave Extension be a Reasonable Accommodation?

Most courts agree that a leave of absence or a leave extension can constitute a reasonable accommodation under the ADA “in some circumstances.” What this means for employers is that a leave of absence or leave extension simply cannot be excluded “in all circumstances” as a possible accommodation to an otherwise qualified individual with a disability. Especially, if a leave of absence or leave extension is being requested by a disabled employee, compliance with the ADA mandates that the employer consider whether such an accommodation is “reasonable” or would impose an undue hardship.

Does a FMLA Leave Policy Satisfy the ADA?

The Family & Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) provides limited rights to medical leave, which may not be available to all employees of an employer. Specifically, FMLA rights may not be available to an employee who (1) has worked less than 12 months, or (2) works at a location with less than 50 employees within 75 miles. The FMLA also generally provides only for 12 weeks of leave.

The ADA otherwise operates independently of the FMLA. Indeed, Department of Labor regulations provide that an “employer must … provide leave under whichever statutory provision provides the greater rights to employees.” 29 C.F.R. § 825.702(a). Since ADA may provide greater leave rights than that provided by the FMLA, a FMLA leave policy does not necessarily satisfy the ADA.

Is Indefinite Leave a Required Accommodation?

Most courts agree, however, that the ADA does not require that an employer provide a disabled employee with indefinite leave. In addressing a claim brought under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the Eleventh Circuit, in in Luke v. Board of Trustees of Fla. A&M University, reasoned in a December 22, 2016 opinion: “While a leave of absence might be a reasonable accommodation in some cases … an accommodation is unreasonable if it does not allow someone to perform his or her duties in the present or immediate future.” The court thus affirmed summary judgment in favor of the employer as to a claim that it improperly denied a six-month extension of medical leave.

In addressing an ADA claim, the Fifth Circuit, in Moss v. Harris County Constable, similarly reasoned in a March 15, 2017 opinion: “[R]easonable accommodation is by its terms … that which presently, or in the immediate future, enables the employee to perform the essential functions of the job in question.” The court thus affirmed summary judgment in favor of an employer which terminated an employee who was taking leave without a specified date to return.

More recently, the First Circuit in Echevarria v. Astrzeneca Pharmaceutical, L.P., found, on May 2, 2017, that a proposed accommodation of an additional twelve months of leave, after the employee had already been on leave for five months, was “facially unreasonable.” Still the Court cautioned:

“Although we have previously suggested that ‘there may be requested leaves so lengthy or open-ended as to be an unreasonable accommodation in any situation’ … we need not – and therefore do not – decide that a request for a lengthy period of leave will be an unreasonable accommodation in every case.”

So, What did UPS Allegedly do Wrong?

According to the EEOC suit and the proposed consent decree, UPS’s 12-month leave of absence cap violated the ADA in two respects. First, the cap was so inflexible that it automatically provided for termination of employment, without regard to the possibility that a short extension could be a reasonable accommodation which did not impose a hardship on UPS. Second, the cap acted as “as a qualification standard, employment test or other selection criteria that screen[ed] out or tend[ed] to screen out a class of individuals with a disability and [was] not job related or consistent with business necessity.”

These allegations are consistent with the position taken by the EEOC in a publication, dated May 9 2016, entitled “Employer-Provided Leave and the Americans with Disabilities Act.” In this publication, the EEOC opined that “although employers are allowed to have leave policies that establish the maximum amount of leave an employer will provide or permit, they may have to grant leave beyond this amount as a reasonable accommodation to employees who require it because of a disability, unless the employer can show that doing so will cause an undue hardship.” The publication suggests communication with an employee nearing the end of maximum leave asking if the employee needs additional leave as a reasonable accommodation to the employee’s disability, and then engaging in an interactive process with the employee regarding leave.

What Should Employers Learn from UPS’s Experience?

As the First Circuit recognized in Echevarria, “[w]hether [a] leave request is reasonable turns on the facts of the case.” A policy which establishes a cap on leave may not necessarily be a violation of the ADA, but a refusal to consider any leave which extends beyond the cap may violate the Act in certain circumstances. Any such policy must thus allow room for a reasonable accommodation assessment whereby the cap can be modified as to a particular individual with a disability. Indeed, employers would do well to voluntarily follow the protocol which UPS will soon be required to follow and seek legal counsel before terminating an employee who has exhausted leave. Otherwise, the result may be a prolonged and expensive lawsuit, such as that experienced by UPS.

By Robert G. Chadwick, Jr., Managing Member, Seltzer Chadwick Soefje & Ladik, PLLC

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) makes it unlawful for employers subject to the Act to discriminate on the basis of a person’s “sex.”  In the past 30 days, three federal appellate courts have addressed the question of whether discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation can be actionable under Title VII as a form of “sex” discrimination.

On March 10, 2017, a panel of the Eleventh Circuit in Evans v. Georgia Regional Hosp. found  (by a 2-1 vote) that it could not recognize sexual orientation claims under Title VII.  In doing so, the panel opined that it was bound by the 1979 Fifth Circuit decision in Blum v. Gulf Oil Co., which had held “[d]ischarge for homosexuality is not prohibited by Title VII.”

On March 24, 2017, a panel of the Second Circuit in Christiansen v. Omnicom Group, Inc. declined to hold that Title VII bans discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.  Similar to the Eleventh Circuit, the panel observed that it lacked the power to reconsider an earlier Second Circuit decision holding that sexual orientation claims are not cognizable under Title VII.  Two of the three judges, however, argued in concurring opinions that the Second Circuit ought to reconsider its earlier precedent.

On April 4, 2017, in an en banc decision, the Seventh Circuit in Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College of Indiana concluded that “discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is a form of sex discrimination” outlawed by Title VII.  Three justices dissented reasoning that “[s]exual orientation is not on the list of forbidden categories of employment discrimination” set forth in Title VII.

So what does it mean for employers that there are seemingly inconsistent appellate opinions as to whether sexual orientation discrimination is prohibited by Title VII?  First, it means that the issue is likely headed to the Supreme Court.  A conflict of opinion amongst lower appellate courts is one basis for the Court to agree to hear a case.

Second, it means that employers can no longer assume that sexual orientation claims under Title VII will be dismissed.  Indeed, many federal courts have already held that gay plaintiffs may be able to survive dismissal under Title VII by couching their claims as gender stereotyping.  In Christensen, therefore, the Second Circuit found that an openly gay male plaintiff pleaded a claim of gender stereotyping under Title VII that was sufficient to survive dismissal.

Finally, it means that employers should be reviewing their personnel policies and training programs to make sure that sexual orientation discrimination is addressed. The alternative could be costly and protracted litigation even if the Supreme Court ultimately and finally decides that discrimination based upon sexual orientation is not a form of “sex” discrimination outlawed under Title VII.