What Texas Employers Need To Know About State’s New Knife & Sword Law!

By Robert G. Chadwick, Jr., Managing Member, Seltzer Chadwick Soefje & Ladik, PLLC.

Prior to September 1, 2017, a person committed a criminal offense in Texas if he or she “intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly” carried on or about his or her person an “illegal knife” anywhere other than “(1) the person’s own premises or premises under premises under the person’s control, or (2) inside of or directly en route to a motor vehicle or watercraft that is owned by the person or is under the person’s control.” An “illegal knife” was defined as including “a knife with a blade over five and on-half inches”, a “hand instrument designed to cut or stab another by being thrown”, a “dagger, including but not limited to a dirk, stiletto, and poniard”, a “bowie knife”, a “sword”, or a “spear.”

Except as to business owners, therefore, it was generally unlawful under the old law for an employee to carry an “illegal knife” onto an employer’s premises. Except within the confines of an automobile being driven by the employee, it was also generally unlawful for an employee to carry an “illegal knife” during work hours away from the employer’s premises.

Effective September 1, 2017, however, there is no such thing in Texas as an “illegal knife.” There is now what is called a “location-restricted knife”, which is defined as a “knife with a blade over five and one-half inches.”  It is unlawful for a person younger than 18 years of age to be in possession of such a knife unless he or she is “(1) on the person’s own premises or premises under premises under the person’s control, (2) inside of or directly en route to a motor vehicle or watercraft that is owned by the person or is under the person’s control, or (3) under the direct supervision of  a parent or legal guardian.”

it is also unlawful for any person to possess a “location-restricted” knife “on the physical premises of a school or educational institution, any grounds or building on which an activity sponsored by the school or education institution is being conducted, or a passenger transportation vehicle or a school or educational institution”, “on the premises of any government court or offices”, “on the premises of a racetrack”, “in a secured area of an airport”, in certain bars, “on the premises where a high school, collegiate or professional sporting event is taking place”, in a “correctional facility”, hospitals, in “an amusement park”, or “on the premises of a church, synagogue or other established place of worship.”

Except as to minors and places enumerated in the new law, therefore, it is now generally lawful for an employee to carry any size or type of knife, sword or spear anywhere during working hours whether at or away from the employers’ premises.  Such carry can be open or concealed.

Accordingly, if a Texas employer wants to prohibit knives, swords or spears at work, it must undertake to do so on its own with the publication and enforcement of an applicable policy. Otherwise, an employee may simply follow the new law.  Such a policy should differentiate bladed instruments which are permissible at work from bladed instruments which are impermissible at work.  That way, an employee will understand that such instruments as letter openers, kitchen knives, and Swiss Army knives are not prohibited.

 

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UPS’s $1.7M Wakeup Call: Does Your Leave of Absence Policy Violate the ADA?

By Robert G. Chadwick, Jr., Managing Member, Seltzer Chadwick Soefje & Ladik, PLLC.

The uncertainty associated with indefinite leaves of absence has prompted many employers to adopt policies which place a cap on the length of leaves of absence. A policy previously adopted by UPS is a common example:

“…if you are absent from your regular occupation for 12 months, you will be administratively separated from employment, regardless of your status on STD [short term disability] or LTD [long term disability].”

Uniform enforcement of a policy providing for administrative termination after a one-year leave of absence has, in fact, been found sufficient to defeat a claim of retaliatory discharge for filing a worker’s compensation claim. See Haggar Clothing Co. v. Hernandez, 164 S.W.3d 386 (Tex. 2005).

For eight years, however, UPS fought a suit brought by the EEOC alleging the aforementioned policy violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). On July 28, 2017, UPS finally agreed to a proposed consent decree with the EEOC. The proposed consent decree, which has not yet been approved by the court as of the date of this writing, requires UPS to, amongst other things, (1) “seek legal advice before terminating the employment of an employee who has reached the end of the medical leave of absence or residual duty/disability period; and (2) pay a group of aggrieved former employees $1,718,500.

What Does the ADA Require?

The ADA prohibits an employer from discriminating against an “qualified individual with a disability” who is an applicant or employee. One form of prohibited discrimination is the use of “qualification standards, employment tests, or other selection criteria that screen out or tend to screen out an individual with a disability or a class of individuals with disabilities unless the standard, test or other criteria …. Is shown [by the employer] to be job-related for the job in question and consistent with business necessity.”

Another form of prohibited discrimination is the failure to make “reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability … unless [the employer] can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business of [the employer].”

Can a Leave of Absence or Leave Extension be a Reasonable Accommodation?

Most courts agree that a leave of absence or a leave extension can constitute a reasonable accommodation under the ADA “in some circumstances.” What this means for employers is that a leave of absence or leave extension simply cannot be excluded “in all circumstances” as a possible accommodation to an otherwise qualified individual with a disability. Especially, if a leave of absence or leave extension is being requested by a disabled employee, compliance with the ADA mandates that the employer consider whether such an accommodation is “reasonable” or would impose an undue hardship.

Does a FMLA Leave Policy Satisfy the ADA?

The Family & Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) provides limited rights to medical leave, which may not be available to all employees of an employer. Specifically, FMLA rights may not be available to an employee who (1) has worked less than 12 months, or (2) works at a location with less than 50 employees within 75 miles. The FMLA also generally provides only for 12 weeks of leave.

The ADA otherwise operates independently of the FMLA. Indeed, Department of Labor regulations provide that an “employer must … provide leave under whichever statutory provision provides the greater rights to employees.” 29 C.F.R. § 825.702(a). Since ADA may provide greater leave rights than that provided by the FMLA, a FMLA leave policy does not necessarily satisfy the ADA.

Is Indefinite Leave a Required Accommodation?

Most courts agree, however, that the ADA does not require that an employer provide a disabled employee with indefinite leave. In addressing a claim brought under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the Eleventh Circuit, in in Luke v. Board of Trustees of Fla. A&M University, reasoned in a December 22, 2016 opinion: “While a leave of absence might be a reasonable accommodation in some cases … an accommodation is unreasonable if it does not allow someone to perform his or her duties in the present or immediate future.” The court thus affirmed summary judgment in favor of the employer as to a claim that it improperly denied a six-month extension of medical leave.

In addressing an ADA claim, the Fifth Circuit, in Moss v. Harris County Constable, similarly reasoned in a March 15, 2017 opinion: “[R]easonable accommodation is by its terms … that which presently, or in the immediate future, enables the employee to perform the essential functions of the job in question.” The court thus affirmed summary judgment in favor of an employer which terminated an employee who was taking leave without a specified date to return.

More recently, the First Circuit in Echevarria v. Astrzeneca Pharmaceutical, L.P., found, on May 2, 2017, that a proposed accommodation of an additional twelve months of leave, after the employee had already been on leave for five months, was “facially unreasonable.” Still the Court cautioned:

“Although we have previously suggested that ‘there may be requested leaves so lengthy or open-ended as to be an unreasonable accommodation in any situation’ … we need not – and therefore do not – decide that a request for a lengthy period of leave will be an unreasonable accommodation in every case.”

So, What did UPS Allegedly do Wrong?

According to the EEOC suit and the proposed consent decree, UPS’s 12-month leave of absence cap violated the ADA in two respects. First, the cap was so inflexible that it automatically provided for termination of employment, without regard to the possibility that a short extension could be a reasonable accommodation which did not impose a hardship on UPS. Second, the cap acted as “as a qualification standard, employment test or other selection criteria that screen[ed] out or tend[ed] to screen out a class of individuals with a disability and [was] not job related or consistent with business necessity.”

These allegations are consistent with the position taken by the EEOC in a publication, dated May 9 2016, entitled “Employer-Provided Leave and the Americans with Disabilities Act.” In this publication, the EEOC opined that “although employers are allowed to have leave policies that establish the maximum amount of leave an employer will provide or permit, they may have to grant leave beyond this amount as a reasonable accommodation to employees who require it because of a disability, unless the employer can show that doing so will cause an undue hardship.” The publication suggests communication with an employee nearing the end of maximum leave asking if the employee needs additional leave as a reasonable accommodation to the employee’s disability, and then engaging in an interactive process with the employee regarding leave.

What Should Employers Learn from UPS’s Experience?

As the First Circuit recognized in Echevarria, “[w]hether [a] leave request is reasonable turns on the facts of the case.” A policy which establishes a cap on leave may not necessarily be a violation of the ADA, but a refusal to consider any leave which extends beyond the cap may violate the Act in certain circumstances. Any such policy must thus allow room for a reasonable accommodation assessment whereby the cap can be modified as to a particular individual with a disability. Indeed, employers would do well to voluntarily follow the protocol which UPS will soon be required to follow and seek legal counsel before terminating an employee who has exhausted leave. Otherwise, the result may be a prolonged and expensive lawsuit, such as that experienced by UPS.

Are Workplace Recording Bans Legal?

By Robert G. Chadwick, Jr., Managing Member, Seltzer Chadwick Soefje & Ladik, PLLC.

Smart phone technology, and the ability of video and audio recordings to be uploaded to social media sites, has prompted many employers to adopt rules regulating the surreptitious recording of workplace interactions.  The “no recording” rule adopted by Whole Foods Market Group, Inc. is a common example:

“It is a violation of [Company] policy to record conversations, phone calls, images or company meetings with any recording device (including but not limited to cellular telephone, PDA, digital recording device, digital camera, etc.) unless prior approval is received from [management], or unless all parties to the conversation give their consent. Violation of this policy will result in corrective action up to and including discharge.”

The business justifications for such a rule can include (1) prevention of workplace bullying, harassment and retaliation, (2) protection of trade secrets and proprietary information, (3) protection of private or embarrassing information shared in confidence, (4) protection of vendor and customer relationships, and (5) encouragement of open dialogue among employees.

The National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”), however, has long held that a work rule violates Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act “if it would reasonably tend to chill employees” from engaging in concerted activities for mutual aid or protection. Such a work rule can violate the Act even if adopted by a non-union employer. Subject to review and enforcement in federal court, the NLRB has the power to order an employer to (1) revise or rescind a work rule determined to violate Section 8(a)(1), and (2) post notices prescribed by the Board.

On June 1, 2017, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed and enforced a 2015 NLRB Decision ordering that Whole Foods’ “no recording” rule be rescinded or revised. The NLRB opined that the rule unqualifiedly prohibited all workplace recordings, including recordings in pursuit of concerted activities for mutual aid or protection.  The Board found that the rule could reasonably chill the employees in the exercise of their protected rights, such as “recording images of protected picketing. documenting unsafe workplace equipment or hazardous working conditions, documenting and publicizing discussions about terms and conditions of employment, documenting inconsistent application of employer rules, or recording evidence to preserve it for later use in administrative or judicial forums in employment-related actions.”

The Second Circuit also enforced an order from the NLRB Decision requiring that a notice be posted at all Whole Foods’ facilities companywide.  The prescribed notice includes the following statement: “The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey this notice.”  The prescribed notice also reminds Whole Foods’ employees of their right to “form, join or assist a union.”

To be clear, the Whole Foods decisions only addressed a rule which unqualifiedly prohibited all workplace recording. The decisions did not go so far as to declare all “no recording” rules unlawful under Section 8(a)(1).  Indeed, at least one previous NLRB decision found that an employer rule that prohibited the use of cameras for recording images in a hospital setting did not violate Section 8(a)(1), in light of the compelling patient privacy interests at stake.

As noted in a previous post on this blog, it is strongly recommended that employee handbooks be periodically updated.  The Whole Foods decisions show why such periodic updates are important.  For any employee handbook with a workplace recording ban similar to the Whole Foods’ rule above, the time for such an update is now.

In this regard, the first remedial action contemplated in response to the Whole Foods decisions need not be the elimination of a recording ban altogether. Indeed, the legal risks of such an option may be prohibitive for certain employers.  Rather, the first remedial actions contemplated should be analyses of two questions:  (1)  Does the existing rule have a potential chilling affect on the exercise of protected employee rights?;  and (2) if so, can the language of the rule be modified to serve its underlying business justifications without the collateral damage of a potential chill on protected employee rights?  Ultimately, the best option may be to maintain the “no recording” rule, albeit with a narrower scope.  Of course, any “no recording” rule should be reviewed with legal counsel prior to adoption.

How Would Your Overtime Exemptions Fare in Court?

By Robert G. Chadwick, Jr., Managing Member, Seltzer Chadwick Soefje & Ladik, PLLC.

On May 30, 2017, a three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in Dewan, et al. v. M-I, LLC, said a jury should decide whether two oil field workers were entitled to overtime pay under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”).  Accordingly, the Court reversed a summary judgment ruling by the District Court which found the workers were exempt from the FLSA’s overtime requirements because they worked “in a bona fide … administrative capacity.”  Absent a settlement, the fate of the exemption for the two old field workers is now in the hands of a federal jury.

The employer’s experience in Dewan underscores five realities of a suit alleging improper reliance on a FLSA overtime exemption. First, FLSA litigation is often prolonged, costly and unpredictable. The suit in Dewan was initially filed on December 14, 2012. Nearly 4½ years later, the dispute is now going back to the District Court and to an uncertain timetable for resolution.

Second, most FLSA suits are filed by former employees, not current employees. While he was still employed, the named plaintiff in Dewan may have regarded exempt status a badge of pride. After his employment ended, the exempt status became the basis for a monetary claim. The absence of complaints by current employees is thus not a barometer for determining the viability of an exemption. Such a complaint may still be filed after separation and reach back two or three years, depending upon the applicable statute of limitations.

Third, it is not the burden of an employee to disprove a FLSA exemption; rather, it is the employer’s burden to prove such an exemption. Dewan shows this burden can be a formidable one, especially if the goal is to avoid an uncertain jury trial. Meeting this burden requires conclusive evidence. If the evidence to support the exemption is lacking or inadequate, the burden may not be met.

Fourth, “it is the actual day-to-day activities of … employees that determine whether the employee is exempt, not the labels the employer or employee place on those duties.”  Even though each of the oil field workers in Dewan held the title of “mud engineer”, it was their actual work in the field which determined whether they were properly classified as exempt.

Finally, employers are not the final arbiters of who is exempt and who is not exempt under the FLSA.  The Act leaves that final determination to judges and juries.  Whether an employer is comfortable with its employee classifications, therefore, is not the most pertinent question in managing the risk of suit. Until the May 30th ruling by the Fifth Circuit, M-I, LLC was likely comfortable that its oil field workers were classified properly. Rather, the most pertinent question is whether the employer can prove (and/or sell) the exemption to a judge and jury.

Dewan provides a wake-up call to employers who have not conducted any review of their employee classifications, or who have not conducted such a review recently.  Periodic reviews and adjustments provide the type of evidence needed to effectively manage the risk of scrutiny by a federal court or the U.S. Department of Labor.  The alternative can be that experienced by M-I, LLC, the meter for whom is still running as to legal fees.

Candidate Screening: Salary History Joins Growing List of Banned Criteria!

By Robert G. Chadwick, Jr., Managing Member, Seltzer Chadwick Soefje & Ladik, PLLC.

On May 4, 2017, New York Mayor Bill De Blasio signed a bill which bars private employers from (1) inquiring about a prospective employee’s salary history during all stages of the employment process, and (2) relying upon a prospective employee’s salary history in the determination of salary. New York City joins Massachusetts, Puerto Rico and Philadelphia which already have similar legislation.  The theory behind such laws is that such inquiries may serve to perpetuate discrimination that job applicants have experienced in the past.

Laws addressing candidate screening are nothing new.  Amongst the federal laws which directly govern pre-employment inquiries are (1) the Americans with Disabilities Act, (2) the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act, (3) Employee Polygraph Protection Act, and (4) the Fair Credit Reporting Act.  Certain pre-employment inquiries have also been recognized to be synonymous with, or evidence of, unlawful discrimination under federal, state or municipal laws.

In recent years, however, states and municipalities have taken the lead in directly regulating certain candidate screening practices. Inquiries regarding salary history are  only the latest screening methods to be targeted.

UNEMPLOYMENT

In 2011 and 2012, respectively, New Jersey and Oregon passed laws prohibiting job postings which state or suggest that (1) the qualifications for the job include current employment, (2) the employer will not consider or review an application for employment submitted by any job applicant currently unemployed, or (3) the employer will only consider or review applications for employment submitted by job applicants who are currently employed. In 2012, the District of Columbia passed a law barring discrimination against an applicant who is unemployed.

CRIMINAL RECORDS

Job Postings

San Francisco requires private employers to state in all job solicitations/advertisements that qualified applicants with arrest and conviction records will be considered for the position.

Inquiries Regarding Arrest Records

Several states have laws limiting inquiries or reliance upon arrests which did not lead to convictions.  These laws vary considerably from state to state and from municipality to municipality.  In California, Illinois, Massachusetts and Rhode Island, for example, employers may not inquire about or use any information related to prior arrests that did not lead to convictions.  Other states, such as ColoradoGeorgiaIdaho, Kansas, Maryland, MichiganNew York, North Carolina, Oklahoma, UtahVirginia, Washington and Wisconsin, (1) exclude certain types of arrest records from employer inquiry, (2) allow an applicant to deny certain types of arrest records, or (3) both.

Other states – Hawaii and Wisconsin –outlaw discrimination against applicants with arrest records.

Inquiries Regarding Juvenile Records

Effective January 1, 2017, private employers in California may not ask applicants about juvenile records relating to arrest, detention, processing or adjudication while the applicant was subject to the juvenile court system.  Other states, including Ohio and Texas, (1) exclude sealed or expunged juvenile records from employer inquiry, (2) allow  an applicant to deny the existence of such records, or (3) both.

Inquiries Regarding Conviction Records

Five states – Hawaii, Kansas, New York, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin – have enacted statutes which make it unlawful for private employers to discriminate against applicants with conviction records. Such statutes have varying exceptions based upon the nature of the job and the suitability of the applicant for the job.  In Washington, an employer may not generally base hiring decisions on convictions, where conviction or release from prison occurred more than 10 years earlier.

Moreover, nine states – Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Jersey, Oregon, Rhode Island and Vermont – have enacted so called “ban the box” statutes which prohibit inquiries by private employers into conviction records until after the employment application.  Many more municipalities, including Austin, Texas, have passed similar “ban the box” ordinances.

In California, a private employer may not ask about minor marijuana convictions that are more than two years old.

Inquiries regarding Conviction Records That Have Been Sealed or Expunged

In California, a private employer may not ask about convictions that have been sealed, expunged or statutorily eradicated, or a referral to or participation in a pretrial or post-trial diversion program.  Other states, including Florida, Kansas, Ohio and Rhode Island, (1) exclude sealed or expunged conviction records from employer inquiry, (2) allow an applicant to generally deny the existence of such a record, or (3) both.

CREDIT HISTORY

Ten states – California, Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, Nevada, Oregon, Vermont and Washington – as well as several municipalities, including the District of Columbia and New York City, place limitations on the ability of private employers to check an applicant’s credit history in making a hiring decision.

MILITARY DISCHARGE STATUS

Subject to certain exceptions, Illinois makes its unlawful to discriminate against any individual in hiring based on military discharge status.

TAKEAWAYS FOR PRIVATE EMPLOYERS

Salary history, employment status, criminal background, credit history and military discharge status have long been criteria by which employers screened candidates for employment.  For instance, previous salary history may be informative as to whether a candidate will likely accept an offer of employment or be satisfied with employment if accepted.

Increasingly at the state and municipal level, however, the interests of job candidates are being favored over the interests of employers.  It is expected, therefore, that the list of states and municipalities which govern the use of such criteria will continue to grow.  It is also expected that the list of banned criteria will continue to grow.

Private employers must thus be vigilant in keeping apprised of the laws of every state and municipality in which they hire employees.  What may be lawful hiring criteria today, may become unlawful hiring criteria tomorrow.

Supreme Court Likely to Resolve Conflict As to Sexual Orientation Bias

By Robert G. Chadwick, Jr., Managing Member, Seltzer Chadwick Soefje & Ladik, PLLC

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) makes it unlawful for employers subject to the Act to discriminate on the basis of a person’s “sex.”  In the past 30 days, three federal appellate courts have addressed the question of whether discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation can be actionable under Title VII as a form of “sex” discrimination.

On March 10, 2017, a panel of the Eleventh Circuit in Evans v. Georgia Regional Hosp. found  (by a 2-1 vote) that it could not recognize sexual orientation claims under Title VII.  In doing so, the panel opined that it was bound by the 1979 Fifth Circuit decision in Blum v. Gulf Oil Co., which had held “[d]ischarge for homosexuality is not prohibited by Title VII.”

On March 24, 2017, a panel of the Second Circuit in Christiansen v. Omnicom Group, Inc. declined to hold that Title VII bans discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.  Similar to the Eleventh Circuit, the panel observed that it lacked the power to reconsider an earlier Second Circuit decision holding that sexual orientation claims are not cognizable under Title VII.  Two of the three judges, however, argued in concurring opinions that the Second Circuit ought to reconsider its earlier precedent.

On April 4, 2017, in an en banc decision, the Seventh Circuit in Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College of Indiana concluded that “discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is a form of sex discrimination” outlawed by Title VII.  Three justices dissented reasoning that “[s]exual orientation is not on the list of forbidden categories of employment discrimination” set forth in Title VII.

So what does it mean for employers that there are seemingly inconsistent appellate opinions as to whether sexual orientation discrimination is prohibited by Title VII?  First, it means that the issue is likely headed to the Supreme Court.  A conflict of opinion amongst lower appellate courts is one basis for the Court to agree to hear a case.

Second, it means that employers can no longer assume that sexual orientation claims under Title VII will be dismissed.  Indeed, many federal courts have already held that gay plaintiffs may be able to survive dismissal under Title VII by couching their claims as gender stereotyping.  In Christensen, therefore, the Second Circuit found that an openly gay male plaintiff pleaded a claim of gender stereotyping under Title VII that was sufficient to survive dismissal.

Finally, it means that employers should be reviewing their personnel policies and training programs to make sure that sexual orientation discrimination is addressed. The alternative could be costly and protracted litigation even if the Supreme Court ultimately and finally decides that discrimination based upon sexual orientation is not a form of “sex” discrimination outlawed under Title VII.

Are States & Municipalities the New Frontier in Employment Law?

By Robert G. Chadwick, Jr., Managing Member, Seltzer Chadwick Soefje & Ladik, PLLC.

For decades, federal employment laws largely defined the obligations of private employers to their employees. Today, the U.S. Department of Labor (“DOL”) administers and enforces more than 180 federal laws. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission enforces seven federal laws.

Recently, the pace of new federal employment legislation has slowed significantly. It’s been nearly a decade since the enactments of (1) the Genetic Information Non-Discrimination Act of 2008, (2) the Fair Minimum Wage Act of 2007 (which raised the federal minimum wage to $7.25 per hour), (3) the Americans with Disabilities Amendments Act of 2008, and (4) the 2009 amendments to the Family & Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) regarding military caregiver leave and qualifying exigency leave. Since that time the Affordable Care Act was passed, but legislative efforts to increase the minimum wage, expand employment discrimination laws to new protected classes and enact paid sick leave have failed. The prospect that such legislation will be any more successful with Republicans currently controlling both Congress and the White House is slim.

To be sure, federal labor agencies have promulgated new administrative regulations in the past decade. These regulations, however, have met with mixed results in the courts. Most recently, a federal court blocked DOL regulations which would have significantly increased the salary threshold for overtime pay exemptions under the Fair Labor Standards Act. Legislation is also already before Congress to roll back some of these regulations. Even the implementation of DOL’s “fiduciary rule” has been delayed. Accordingly, contraction, not expansion, of administrative regulations is the prediction for the foreseeable future.

In sharp contrast to the federal government, states and municipalities have successfully expanded, in recent years, the legal rights of employees in the private sector. In many locations, employees now enjoy greater rights under state and municipal laws than they do under federal law.

MINIMUM WAGES: As of January 1, 2017, 29 states have higher minimum wages than $7.25 per hour. In many states, municipalities have ordinances with higher minimum wages than those prescribed by federal or even state law. For instance, Seattle’s minimum wage is currently $15.00 per hour, which is higher than the Washington State prescribed minimum wage of $11.00 per hour.

OVERTIME PAY: Although DOL was unsuccessful in its efforts to raise the salary thresholds for overtime pay exemptions, California and New York have successfully raised such thresholds under their respective state wage laws. California law provides for daily overtime pay for work in excess of 8 hours.

MEAL AND REST PERIODS: 19 states direct employers to provide, under certain circumstances, a minimum meal period. A handful of states require paid rest periods during the work day.

PROTECTED CLASSES: Many states and municipalities have also enacted legislation barring discrimination against protected classes not otherwise expressly protected by federal law, including:

* Sexual orientation
* Gender identity and expression
* Familial or marital status
* Arrest and conviction records
* Credit history
* Off-duty lawful conduct
* AIDS/HIV
* Hepatitis C
* Domestic violence victims
* Height or weight
* Any age
* Political activities or affiliations

HARASSMENT AND DISCRIMINATION POLICIES AND TRAINING: California regulations specify the information which must be included in an employer’s harassment and discrimination policies, the methods by which the policies must be distributed, and the circumstances under which multilingual policies are required. California law also mandates supervisory training for employers with 50 or more employees.

LEAVE FROM WORK: Many states have enacted leave legislation which is more generous or inclusive than the Family & Medical Leave Act. A few states mandate leave for parents to attend school-related events and activities for their children. Some states have paid family leave and/or sick leave requirements.

UNIONIZATION: In 2015, Seattle passed an ordinance which gives Uber and Lyft drivers within the city the right to form a union.

For private employers, keeping up with fast-changing federal employment laws has historically been a challenge in and of itself. The onset of fast-changing state and municipal employment laws which are more restrictive than their federal counterparts, however, presents even greater challenges.

First, state and municipal developments do not necessarily receive the publicity afforded federal developments.  It is thus easier for a change at the state or local level to escape an employer’s notice, especially if the employer is headquartered elsewhere.

Second, the proliferation of employment laws at the state and municipal level presents a unique challenge not presented by federal laws for employers with establishments in multiple states or municipalities.  For such employers, compliance and risk strategies must account for the different legal obligations which may be applicable to each establishment.

So, are states and municipalities the new frontier in employment law? It appears that the answer to this question is yes.  For this reason, it is crucial that compliance and risk strategies, including employee handbooks, be reviewed annually to account for fast-changing state and municipal employment laws.  Otherwise, the price may be liability for fines, damages or worse.

Texas Supreme Court Upholds Right of Employee to Sue for Sexual Assault!

By Robert G. Chadwick, Jr., Managing Member, Seltzer Chadwick Soefje & Ladik, PLLC

In October 2011, a female associate at the Frisco, Texas Steak N Shake restaurant was allegedly sexually assaulted by her supervisor.  She subsequently filed a common law assault suit claiming Steak N Shake was responsible for the misconduct of a vice principal. There are many likely reasons why Steak N Shake was not also sued under the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act (“TCHRA”), which prohibits gender discrimination in employment. Chief among these likely reasons is the $300,000 maximum damage cap imposed by the TCHRA, which does not exist as to common law assault claims.

In reliance upon the 2010 Texas Supreme Court opinion in Waffle House, Inc. v. Williams, the trial court determined that the TCHRA provided the exclusive remedy for workplace sexual harassment, which included the plaintiff’s assault claim.  Accordingly, the trial court granted Steak N Shake’s motion for summary judgment.  Upon appeal, Dallas’ Fifth District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling.

In a February 24, 2017 opinion, the Texas Supreme Court reversed the summary judgment ruling. The Court confirmed again that, “[w]here the gravamen of a plaintiff’s case is TCHRA covered harassment, the Act forecloses common-law theories predicated on the same underlying sexual-harassment facts.”  However, “where the gravamen of the plaintiff’s case is assault, we hold that the TCHRA does not preempt a common law assault claim.”

For Texas employers, the significance of the decision in B.C. v. Steak N. Shake Operations, Inc. is not limited to a potential exposure to higher damage awards.  Employers are encouraged to review their employment practices liability insurance policies to determine whether assault claims are excluded from coverage.

The Far Reach of Title VII’s Bar Against Gender Stereotyping!

By Robert G. Chadwick, Jr., Managing Member, Seltzer Chadwick Soefje & Ladik, PLLC.

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) expressly prohibits discrimination in employment “because of sex.”  In 1989, the U.S. Supreme Court in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins held that Title VII bars not just discrimination because of biological sex, but also gender stereotyping – failing to act and appear according to expectations defined by gender. The Court specifically opined: “In the specific context of sex stereotyping, an employer who acts on the basis of a belief that a woman cannot be aggressive, or that she must not be, has acted on the basis of gender.”

In recent years, Title VII’s bar against gender stereotyping has taken on new significance.  On November 4, 2016, a Pennsylvania federal court in EEOC v. Scott Medical Health Center, Inc. found: “There is no more obvious form of sex stereotyping than making a determination that a person should conform to heterosexuality.”  In 2011, the Eleventh Circuit in Glenn v. Brumby observed: “…discrimination against a transgender individual because of her gender-nonconformity is sex discrimination…” Discrimination in employment on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity have thus been found by some courts to be forms of gender stereotyping outlawed by Title VII.

These developments beg the question:  How far does Title VII’s bar against gender stereotyping potentially reach?  The answer should be sobering to employers.

What are Some Common Gender Stereotypes?

Examples of improper gender stereotypes include the following:

Personality Traits: Women are expected to be passive and emotional and talk in a feminine manner; men are expected to be self-confident, unemotional and aggressive.

Physical Appearance: Women are expected to dress in a feminine manner, and wear make-up or jewelry; men are expected to dress in a masculine manner, have short hair and not wear make-up or jewelry.

Social Dynamics: Women are expected to be disinterested in discussions regarding masculine topics, such as sports and action films; men are expected to be knowledgeable regarding masculine topics, such as sports and action films.

Domestic Behaviors: Women employees are expected to be able to make coffee or pot luck dishes; men are not expected to do so.

Occupations:  Women are expected to be primarily interested in clerical, teaching and nursing occupations; men are expected to be primarily interested in manual and management occupations.

Relationship Norms:  Women are expected to be primarily interested in men; men are expected to be primarily interested in women.

What Gender Stereotypes Have Been Found to Support a Bias Claim Under Title VII?

Examples of cases in which cognizable claims under Title VII were stated based upon gender stereotypes include the following:

Doe v. City of Belleville: The Seventh Circuit held that a young man who was taunted by co-workers for wearing an earring and who was repeatedly asked whether he was “a boy or a girl” clearly stated a Title VII sexual harassment claim by alleging that “the way in which he projected the sexual aspect of his personality … did not conform to his co-workers’ view of appropriate masculine behavior.”

Nichols v. Azteca Restaurant Enterprises:  The Ninth Circuit held that a waiter who was harassed by his co-workers for carrying a serving tray “like a woman” stated a claim for sexual harassment under Title VII because his antagonists were motivated by his gender-nonconforming behavior.

EEOC v. Boh Bros. Construction Co.:  The Fifth Circuit held that the evidence supported the EEOC’s asserted sex stereotyping theory of same-sex harassment.  This evidence showed that the harassment originated from an employee’s use of Wet Ones rather than toilet paper at work, which the employee’s supervisor viewed as “kind of gay” and “feminine.”

Gonzales v. Marriott Intl., Inc.:  A California federal court refused to dismiss a Title VII claim by a female employee against Marriott alleging sex stereotyping because it made reasonable accommodations for other recently-pregnant employees, but not for her  because she was a gestational surrogate.

What are the Takeaways for Employers?

Forcing an employee to fit a gender expectation – whether that expectation involves personality traits, physical appearance, social dynamics, domestic behaviors, occupations or relationship norms – constitutes gender stereotyping and violates Title VII.  The reach of Title VII thus extends beyond gender animus or bias and can include subjective preconceptions regarding a particular gender borne merely from personal experience, ignorance or mass media portrayals.

As part of an employer’s overall strategy for preventing discrimination in the workplace, therefore, employee handbooks, supervisory training and harassment training must thus necessarily address gender stereotyping.  The consequences of not adequately combating gender stereotyping include low employee morale and productivity, employee turnover and costly litigation.